In 1995, a subway system located in Tokyo Japan was the target of a terrorist attack by a radical religious cult known as the Aum Shinrikyo. Their strategy included converging at the Kasumigaseki station and dispersing poisonous gas (sarin) into the air. This attack was not considered to be politically motivated; rather, it was an attack stimulated by the desire to distress the Japanese government, in an attempt to seize power. The attack was inclusive of five subways systems, and resulted in the death of twelve people and over 5000 requiring hospitalization. This essay will examine the attack by Aum Shinrikyo on the transportation system in Japan. This paper will also relate the threat of this type of attack with the risk management perspectives
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John Parachini “is a senior international policy analyst and director of the Intelligence Policy Center at the RAND Corporation.” He has in charge of Rand Projects concerning the “propensity of terrorists to acquire chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons; how the U.S. government can capture terrorists ' digital information; scenario development for counterterrorism planning; and the danger of terrorists and rogue states acquiring nuclear material expertise from the former Soviet Union.” (http://www.rand.org/about/people/p/parachini_john_v.html) John Parachini risk management perspective is inclusive of concluding that there is difficulty in gauging the threat of terrorism. He explains that what is missing from the equation is a discussion concerning how to develop a model that will be broad enough to assess threats, both internationally and domestically. The lack of this ability leads to random conclusions, assessments by individuals, based on their personal …show more content…
In terms of planning, the Japanese Government ignored early warning signs of an impending attack. As Parachini suggested, the government should have sought intelligence concerning the potential ramifications of an attack. With that in mind, the primary objective should have been an attempt to prevent this attack. What followed next should have been the preparation and training to respond to this or any attack. This attack had ill-prepared first responders, and a lack of communication between agencies. Both training and communication would have improved the outcome of this
John Parachini “is a senior international policy analyst and director of the Intelligence Policy Center at the RAND Corporation.” He has in charge of Rand Projects concerning the “propensity of terrorists to acquire chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons; how the U.S. government can capture terrorists ' digital information; scenario development for counterterrorism planning; and the danger of terrorists and rogue states acquiring nuclear material expertise from the former Soviet Union.” (http://www.rand.org/about/people/p/parachini_john_v.html) John Parachini risk management perspective is inclusive of concluding that there is difficulty in gauging the threat of terrorism. He explains that what is missing from the equation is a discussion concerning how to develop a model that will be broad enough to assess threats, both internationally and domestically. The lack of this ability leads to random conclusions, assessments by individuals, based on their personal …show more content…
In terms of planning, the Japanese Government ignored early warning signs of an impending attack. As Parachini suggested, the government should have sought intelligence concerning the potential ramifications of an attack. With that in mind, the primary objective should have been an attempt to prevent this attack. What followed next should have been the preparation and training to respond to this or any attack. This attack had ill-prepared first responders, and a lack of communication between agencies. Both training and communication would have improved the outcome of this