John Lewis Gaddis (John Lewis Gaddis), a professor at Yale University, is one of the most prominent American political scholars of the 20th century, especially his second half. The main theme of his works is the Cold War in all its aspects and manifestations. It was she who became the subject of five of his eight monographs, published from 1972 to 2004.
Gaddis recently released the ninth book, The New History of the Cold War, in which he summed up his research into this long-standing conflict. About half of its volume is devoted to finding answers to only two key questions: what led to the Cold War, and whether it was possible to stop it at the initial stage?
Gaddis is not inclined to historical fatalism and, apparently, does not believe too …show more content…
Both these states arose as a result of highly ideological revolutions that left a deep imprint on the mentality of their population and, above all, the political elite. These ideologies, despite all their differences, claimed universal value; in other words, both American and Soviet leaders were confident that their countries could and should serve as models for all of humanity. Both the United States and the Soviet Union possessed gigantic territories and extended maritime borders, with each country's coasts washed by the waters of three oceans, which in itself entailed the existence of vast intersecting geopolitical interests. Finally, they entered the Second World War as a result of the aggression of third countries, to which they were not ready. Although these countries suffered absolutely incomparable losses (about 27 million inhabitants of the USSR against 300,000 Americans), they both tried in no case to prevent a repetition of such a situation in the …show more content…
Roosevelt hoped, even after the war, to maintain allied relations with Britain and the USSR, to create an effective system of international security on the basis of the United Nations and resolutely to exclude the very possibility of Europe slipping into new military conflicts. For this he was even ready to go to the prompt withdrawal of American troops from Europe (during the Tehran Conference he promised Stalin that this would happen within two years after the victory over Hitler) and on the actual recognition of the special role (however not of domination) of the USSR in Eastern Europe, but this was already the limit of its compliance. He still managed to make sure during his lifetime that Stalin planted his proteges in Poland, which became a bitter disappointment for him (the famous American diplomat Averell Harriman, who in 1943-46 was an ambassador to the USSR, said in his memoirs that two weeks before his death Roosevelt complained to him of the insidiousness of Stalin, who violated the promises in Yalta). His successor Truman from the outset trusted Stalin much less and was prepared in advance for the fact that American security would have to be at least partially provided with force, including support for an atomic bomb. The third partner, Churchill, reasoned much easier. He wanted to preserve the British Empire intact, and for this reason he was
Gaddis recently released the ninth book, The New History of the Cold War, in which he summed up his research into this long-standing conflict. About half of its volume is devoted to finding answers to only two key questions: what led to the Cold War, and whether it was possible to stop it at the initial stage?
Gaddis is not inclined to historical fatalism and, apparently, does not believe too …show more content…
Both these states arose as a result of highly ideological revolutions that left a deep imprint on the mentality of their population and, above all, the political elite. These ideologies, despite all their differences, claimed universal value; in other words, both American and Soviet leaders were confident that their countries could and should serve as models for all of humanity. Both the United States and the Soviet Union possessed gigantic territories and extended maritime borders, with each country's coasts washed by the waters of three oceans, which in itself entailed the existence of vast intersecting geopolitical interests. Finally, they entered the Second World War as a result of the aggression of third countries, to which they were not ready. Although these countries suffered absolutely incomparable losses (about 27 million inhabitants of the USSR against 300,000 Americans), they both tried in no case to prevent a repetition of such a situation in the …show more content…
Roosevelt hoped, even after the war, to maintain allied relations with Britain and the USSR, to create an effective system of international security on the basis of the United Nations and resolutely to exclude the very possibility of Europe slipping into new military conflicts. For this he was even ready to go to the prompt withdrawal of American troops from Europe (during the Tehran Conference he promised Stalin that this would happen within two years after the victory over Hitler) and on the actual recognition of the special role (however not of domination) of the USSR in Eastern Europe, but this was already the limit of its compliance. He still managed to make sure during his lifetime that Stalin planted his proteges in Poland, which became a bitter disappointment for him (the famous American diplomat Averell Harriman, who in 1943-46 was an ambassador to the USSR, said in his memoirs that two weeks before his death Roosevelt complained to him of the insidiousness of Stalin, who violated the promises in Yalta). His successor Truman from the outset trusted Stalin much less and was prepared in advance for the fact that American security would have to be at least partially provided with force, including support for an atomic bomb. The third partner, Churchill, reasoned much easier. He wanted to preserve the British Empire intact, and for this reason he was