First, the child in the broom closet is being denied their freedom of willing, choice, and autonomy. Indeed, one might note the child is even being denied its basic right of consenting. Therefore, this exchange between the citizens of Omelas and the child is not a “free exchange” insofar as coercion (force, threats of force, deception, etc.) seems to be the governing law of the exchange. Ergo, the child is being used as merely a means rather than an end. Next, one could argue that the child, being used as a means to the Omelas’ benefit, is a rational being. It follows then, from the Kantian view that the citizens’ manipulation of the child’s welfare as merely a means to their arbitrary end constitutes a wholly immoral act. Now there may be a number of objections to the Kantian interpretation. The main objection stems from the vagueness of the term “rational being” as applied to the child. Although it is stated in Le Guin’s short story that the child has a recollection of life outside of the cellar, its rational faculties are deteriorated to the point that we could not posit that it is a rational being. Therefore, the people of Omelas are right in torturing the child because it results in good for those who can appreciate it. This objection is a variant of the utilitarian argument, and it can be refuted quite easily. The repeated use of this child as a means to Omelas’ arbitrary ends may very well be the cause of the child’s developmental impairments. In a Kantian interpretation, this child is seen by Omelas as a thing, whose existence has a value for some other entity as opposed to an objective end, a being whose existence is an end in itself. Not only would Kant argue that the citizens of Omelas are complicit in a wholly immoral act, letting the child go would be a start in creating a more ideal state, the kingdom of ends. Although
First, the child in the broom closet is being denied their freedom of willing, choice, and autonomy. Indeed, one might note the child is even being denied its basic right of consenting. Therefore, this exchange between the citizens of Omelas and the child is not a “free exchange” insofar as coercion (force, threats of force, deception, etc.) seems to be the governing law of the exchange. Ergo, the child is being used as merely a means rather than an end. Next, one could argue that the child, being used as a means to the Omelas’ benefit, is a rational being. It follows then, from the Kantian view that the citizens’ manipulation of the child’s welfare as merely a means to their arbitrary end constitutes a wholly immoral act. Now there may be a number of objections to the Kantian interpretation. The main objection stems from the vagueness of the term “rational being” as applied to the child. Although it is stated in Le Guin’s short story that the child has a recollection of life outside of the cellar, its rational faculties are deteriorated to the point that we could not posit that it is a rational being. Therefore, the people of Omelas are right in torturing the child because it results in good for those who can appreciate it. This objection is a variant of the utilitarian argument, and it can be refuted quite easily. The repeated use of this child as a means to Omelas’ arbitrary ends may very well be the cause of the child’s developmental impairments. In a Kantian interpretation, this child is seen by Omelas as a thing, whose existence has a value for some other entity as opposed to an objective end, a being whose existence is an end in itself. Not only would Kant argue that the citizens of Omelas are complicit in a wholly immoral act, letting the child go would be a start in creating a more ideal state, the kingdom of ends. Although