I. PARTIES TO THE CASE: IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21 (2005) the plaintiff of this case is Gabriel Alvarez, Individually and on behalf of all other workers of Packing plant in Pasco, Washington. The employees had a class action lawsuit against the defendant Barber Foods and IBP.
II. FORUM: In two separate cases, the employees of the packing plant sued Berber Foods and IBP in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
III. STATUTE(S) INVOLVED IN THE CASE: the statutory of the Portal-to-portal act responded to what the congress considered an interpretation of compensable “work” under the FLSA. Petition 88(a) says that there is no mandatory compensation for “walking to and from the actual place of performance of the principal …show more content…
Roberts argued that Steiner’s of activities within the definition of “principal activities” is explicitly limited to 4(a) (2) rule in regards of preliminary and postliminary is not applicable to 4(a) (1) rule in regards to employees’ walking and travel time. Counsel for the employers, Carter G. Phillips, argued that Steiner formed a third category of activities “integral and indispensable” these activities applied to be compensable, but these activities were not considered “primary activities”. In addition, Carter G. Phillips, claimed “that simply because the changing of clothes may constitute an employee’s principal activity, this “does not necessarily mean that travel time between the clothes-changing place and the actual place of performance would be excluded from the type of travel to which section 4(a) refers.” (Floridabar.org, …show more content…
V Alvarez. At Anderson case the walking preceded the employees’ principal activity whereas, at IBP case, the walking occurs after the work day begins and before it
II. FORUM: In two separate cases, the employees of the packing plant sued Berber Foods and IBP in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
III. STATUTE(S) INVOLVED IN THE CASE: the statutory of the Portal-to-portal act responded to what the congress considered an interpretation of compensable “work” under the FLSA. Petition 88(a) says that there is no mandatory compensation for “walking to and from the actual place of performance of the principal …show more content…
Roberts argued that Steiner’s of activities within the definition of “principal activities” is explicitly limited to 4(a) (2) rule in regards of preliminary and postliminary is not applicable to 4(a) (1) rule in regards to employees’ walking and travel time. Counsel for the employers, Carter G. Phillips, argued that Steiner formed a third category of activities “integral and indispensable” these activities applied to be compensable, but these activities were not considered “primary activities”. In addition, Carter G. Phillips, claimed “that simply because the changing of clothes may constitute an employee’s principal activity, this “does not necessarily mean that travel time between the clothes-changing place and the actual place of performance would be excluded from the type of travel to which section 4(a) refers.” (Floridabar.org, …show more content…
V Alvarez. At Anderson case the walking preceded the employees’ principal activity whereas, at IBP case, the walking occurs after the work day begins and before it