The theory was that, “the end of the Cold War deprived the United States and the Soviet Union of the incentive to provide arms to combatants in proxy wars, even for combatants who wanted to go on fighting” (Toft, 2010, p. 14). Without weapons and ammunition, it seems likely that the conflicting sides would be more willing to achieve a negotiated settlement (Toft, 2010, p. 14). As evidenced, however, we know that the United States and the Soviet Union continued to provide arms to many smaller nations, albeit in a more circumspect manner. These tactics functioned to enhance the shroud of secrecy and tension that was so prevalent throughout the Cold war. It was almost as if the United States and the Soviet Union were in competition to see who could inflict the most damage upon each other without regard to the damage sustained by the country they used to further their
The theory was that, “the end of the Cold War deprived the United States and the Soviet Union of the incentive to provide arms to combatants in proxy wars, even for combatants who wanted to go on fighting” (Toft, 2010, p. 14). Without weapons and ammunition, it seems likely that the conflicting sides would be more willing to achieve a negotiated settlement (Toft, 2010, p. 14). As evidenced, however, we know that the United States and the Soviet Union continued to provide arms to many smaller nations, albeit in a more circumspect manner. These tactics functioned to enhance the shroud of secrecy and tension that was so prevalent throughout the Cold war. It was almost as if the United States and the Soviet Union were in competition to see who could inflict the most damage upon each other without regard to the damage sustained by the country they used to further their