Sanctuary cities are one of the best examples of “For me but not for thee” thinking that all too often exists when federalism is up for discussion. For too long federalism has been a political tool used by whichever party seeks to gain control of an issue. With sanctuary cities, those who are typically of a more pro-immigrant persuasion are all too happy to allow the federal government to prevent conservative states from passing restrictions on immigrants while America’s more liberal cities ignore federal requests to turn over undocumented immigrants. This introduction, while somewhat antagonistic, is meant to highlight the key question: If Federal control is as pure as many claim it to be, how are sanctuary cities allowed to exist? We’ll examine,
…show more content…
There is spirited debate over where precisely localities would derive this authority. According to traditional understanding of Federalism, such authority could only exist in the instance that state governments have such authority. This precedent was established when Justice John Dillon wrote in Cedar Rapids & Missouri River R. Co. v. Herring that “A municipal corporation possesses and can exercise the following powers and no others: First, those granted in express words (from the state); second, those necessarily implied or necessarily incident to the powers expressly granted; third, those absolutely essential to the declared objects and purposes of the corporation-not simply convenient, but indispensable; and fourth, any fair doubt as to the existence of a power is resolved by the courts against the corporation.” (Cedar Rapids & Missouri River R. Co. v. Herring 1884) Thus, because localities are simply political subdivisions of the State. Additionally, when the decision was handed down in the most recent immigration federalism dispute in United States v. Arizona, the Supreme Court found that “The Supremacy Clause gives Congress the power to preempt state law…Intent can be inferred from a framework of regulation ‘so pervasive...that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it’ or where a ‘federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.’ Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218, 230. Second, state laws are preempted when they conflict with federal law, including when they stand ‘as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.’ Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 67. Pp.
There is spirited debate over where precisely localities would derive this authority. According to traditional understanding of Federalism, such authority could only exist in the instance that state governments have such authority. This precedent was established when Justice John Dillon wrote in Cedar Rapids & Missouri River R. Co. v. Herring that “A municipal corporation possesses and can exercise the following powers and no others: First, those granted in express words (from the state); second, those necessarily implied or necessarily incident to the powers expressly granted; third, those absolutely essential to the declared objects and purposes of the corporation-not simply convenient, but indispensable; and fourth, any fair doubt as to the existence of a power is resolved by the courts against the corporation.” (Cedar Rapids & Missouri River R. Co. v. Herring 1884) Thus, because localities are simply political subdivisions of the State. Additionally, when the decision was handed down in the most recent immigration federalism dispute in United States v. Arizona, the Supreme Court found that “The Supremacy Clause gives Congress the power to preempt state law…Intent can be inferred from a framework of regulation ‘so pervasive...that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it’ or where a ‘federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.’ Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218, 230. Second, state laws are preempted when they conflict with federal law, including when they stand ‘as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.’ Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 67. Pp.