Critical Analysis
‘Epihenomenalism and Eliminativism’
Trenton Merricks
In this paper, I will be presenting a critical analysis of Trenton Merricks’s ‘Epiphenomenalism and Eliminativism’ (2001). Merricks delivers a strong argument for the elimination of non-living macro-physical objects, and the denial of causal powers that these types of objects may be said to have: he labels this argument the ‘overdetermination argument’, which he illustrates with an example of a baseball shattering a window. I wish to object to the elimination of non-living macro-physical objects by accounting for the plausibility of macro-causation. I intend to provide objections and responses to premises 1-3 of Merricks’s argument. By highlighting the weak spots of the …show more content…
When we wish to describe macro-objects and relations, we refer to the laws of classical mechanics: for example, Newtonian Laws (1-3), the Law of Conservation of Energy, the Law of Conservation of Momentum, etc. (Robert Coolman, “What is Classical Mechanics”) In contrast, we turn to the laws of quantum mechanics when working to analyze micro-objects and relations. Examples of these include quantized properties, waves of light, etc. (Robert Coolman, “What is Quantum Mechanics) What’s more, laws of classical mechanics—study of macro objects—are useful in that they regard observable and stable forms of matter. Contra-classical mechanics, the study of quantum mechanics is very probabilistic: in essence, everything is a theory, which is made even more ambiguous by the fact that we are dealing with unobservable micro-entities. When we deal with such probabilistic factors, we default to the most plausible theory, which doesn’t take into account evidence that we do not yet have.
At this point, I would like to introduce Leibniz’s Law, which is a doctrine that states that if two entities do not share the same properties, they can be said to be distinct. Following that doctrine, micro and macro are clearly different entities, seeing as they differ in methods of description, appearance and several other factors. Because they are distinct, one can say that they have distinct causal powers. In light of macro-objects having causal powers, they must be said to exist, according to Alexander’s Dictum, which states that ‘to be real is to have causal powers’. (2001,
‘Epihenomenalism and Eliminativism’
Trenton Merricks
In this paper, I will be presenting a critical analysis of Trenton Merricks’s ‘Epiphenomenalism and Eliminativism’ (2001). Merricks delivers a strong argument for the elimination of non-living macro-physical objects, and the denial of causal powers that these types of objects may be said to have: he labels this argument the ‘overdetermination argument’, which he illustrates with an example of a baseball shattering a window. I wish to object to the elimination of non-living macro-physical objects by accounting for the plausibility of macro-causation. I intend to provide objections and responses to premises 1-3 of Merricks’s argument. By highlighting the weak spots of the …show more content…
When we wish to describe macro-objects and relations, we refer to the laws of classical mechanics: for example, Newtonian Laws (1-3), the Law of Conservation of Energy, the Law of Conservation of Momentum, etc. (Robert Coolman, “What is Classical Mechanics”) In contrast, we turn to the laws of quantum mechanics when working to analyze micro-objects and relations. Examples of these include quantized properties, waves of light, etc. (Robert Coolman, “What is Quantum Mechanics) What’s more, laws of classical mechanics—study of macro objects—are useful in that they regard observable and stable forms of matter. Contra-classical mechanics, the study of quantum mechanics is very probabilistic: in essence, everything is a theory, which is made even more ambiguous by the fact that we are dealing with unobservable micro-entities. When we deal with such probabilistic factors, we default to the most plausible theory, which doesn’t take into account evidence that we do not yet have.
At this point, I would like to introduce Leibniz’s Law, which is a doctrine that states that if two entities do not share the same properties, they can be said to be distinct. Following that doctrine, micro and macro are clearly different entities, seeing as they differ in methods of description, appearance and several other factors. Because they are distinct, one can say that they have distinct causal powers. In light of macro-objects having causal powers, they must be said to exist, according to Alexander’s Dictum, which states that ‘to be real is to have causal powers’. (2001,