Section A This investigation will asses the ways in which the United State’s and the Soviet Union’s reactions and perceptions differed in the years leading up to and during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. The evaluation of the two countries will dwell into war time reporting, retrospective analysis, opinion polls, and the opinions of relatives of the leaders, among other aspects of the crisis. Newspaper articles will be used to assess the differing reactions of the press, while books and interviews will provide invaluable retrospective analysis. Two sources, “Soviet Perspective on the Cuban Missile Crisis from Nikita Khrushchev’s Son,” an interview, and “Kennedy Replies,” a New York Times article, will then be evaluated to establish their
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Described by Mark Laffey in his article, "Decolonizing the Cuban Missile Crisis," published in International Studies Quarterly, as “the most dangerous crisis the world has ever seen,” the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 is no exception. According to Dr. Philip Brenner, a professor in the School of International Service at American University, the United States believed that the Soviets were concerned with disrupting the balance of power in world affairs in order to challenge American interests without restraint. He also states that the U.S. …show more content…
U.S. Maritime Correspondent, Sam LaGrone, on Sergei Khrushchev. Published on October 24, 2012 by USNI News, the primary media outlet of the United States Naval Institute, this interview offers invaluable insight to the Soviet perspective due to the close relation of the interviewee to
Nikita Khrushchev, the Soviet premier during the crisis (Sergei is Nikita’s son). Conducted almost fifty years after the event, the interview allows for a more retrospective analysis of the Soviet perception, although it may also suffer from the loss/alteration of memories incurred through the passing of time. The reliability of the interview also suffers from its transcription from verbal to written form. This is particularly evident in LaGrone’s generous use of ellipses throughout the published version; for example, “otherwise they would lose face . . . and your allies…” and “…Europeans had enemies at the gates for all of their history. . . . The American bases.” With respect to bias, one could easily argue that Sergei could never be objective with the Soviet Union due to his relationship with Nikita. Similarly, his qualification of the United States may also suffer from this bias. All things considered and despite of its numerous limitations, the interview does an outstanding job of providing us with outstanding insight on the actual reactions
Described by Mark Laffey in his article, "Decolonizing the Cuban Missile Crisis," published in International Studies Quarterly, as “the most dangerous crisis the world has ever seen,” the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 is no exception. According to Dr. Philip Brenner, a professor in the School of International Service at American University, the United States believed that the Soviets were concerned with disrupting the balance of power in world affairs in order to challenge American interests without restraint. He also states that the U.S. …show more content…
U.S. Maritime Correspondent, Sam LaGrone, on Sergei Khrushchev. Published on October 24, 2012 by USNI News, the primary media outlet of the United States Naval Institute, this interview offers invaluable insight to the Soviet perspective due to the close relation of the interviewee to
Nikita Khrushchev, the Soviet premier during the crisis (Sergei is Nikita’s son). Conducted almost fifty years after the event, the interview allows for a more retrospective analysis of the Soviet perception, although it may also suffer from the loss/alteration of memories incurred through the passing of time. The reliability of the interview also suffers from its transcription from verbal to written form. This is particularly evident in LaGrone’s generous use of ellipses throughout the published version; for example, “otherwise they would lose face . . . and your allies…” and “…Europeans had enemies at the gates for all of their history. . . . The American bases.” With respect to bias, one could easily argue that Sergei could never be objective with the Soviet Union due to his relationship with Nikita. Similarly, his qualification of the United States may also suffer from this bias. All things considered and despite of its numerous limitations, the interview does an outstanding job of providing us with outstanding insight on the actual reactions