Introduction
The overarching goal of this paper is to understand the Deepwater Program SoS engineering and integration failures before the program change in 2007 and develop recommendations for future similar SoS programs that can potentially prevent some of the failures from occurring. In order to achieve the goal of this study, reviews of documents produced by the Department of Defense (DoD), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports related to the Deepwater Program are examined by leveraging lectures given in SE 4950 class. This paper only focuses on the system engineering and integration issues of the Deepwater Program before the program’s major change in 2007.
Background
The Deepwater …show more content…
As early as 2004, the USCG received questions of concerns and criticisms from several external agencies. For example, the effectiveness of the LSI and the “hands-off” management and engineering decision making by the USCG was criticized by the GAO in their March 2004 report GAO-04-380. In 2007, the Department of Homeland Security discovered significant structural design flaws and insufficient C4I capabilities that failed to meet the documented post 9/11 operational requirements. Then in 2006, the GAO reported problematic collaboration among the subcontractors which made any decision-making difficult among them. As a result, the Justice Department conducted an investigation of the Deepwater Program in 2007 and the USCG to assume the role of LSI for the program [CRS Report for Congress, 2007]. In 2010, Congress passed the Coast Guard Authorization Act which prohibited the further use of lead system integrators [Shuster, B., …show more content…
The Deepwater Program provides an example of what can happen when performance requirements are not properly developed and managed.
Departmental reviews in 2007 found there was lack of clarity in performance specifications. In the case of the NSC, for example, performance specifications caused significant disagreements within the Coast Guard. During phase 2 of the contract award, design standards were converted to guidance, and this decision permitted industry teams to select their own alternative standards.
Staffing
Oversight of an LSI of a complex program like Deepwater requires depth of expertise in multiple acquisition-related fields such as program management, system integration, and financial management. In 2007, Congress learned that USCG did not have the required acquisition personnel or experience to manage Deepwater program. The lack of such depth becomes more evident when reviewing the overall Deepwater program acquisition strategy and risks inherent when the strategy was
The overarching goal of this paper is to understand the Deepwater Program SoS engineering and integration failures before the program change in 2007 and develop recommendations for future similar SoS programs that can potentially prevent some of the failures from occurring. In order to achieve the goal of this study, reviews of documents produced by the Department of Defense (DoD), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports related to the Deepwater Program are examined by leveraging lectures given in SE 4950 class. This paper only focuses on the system engineering and integration issues of the Deepwater Program before the program’s major change in 2007.
Background
The Deepwater …show more content…
As early as 2004, the USCG received questions of concerns and criticisms from several external agencies. For example, the effectiveness of the LSI and the “hands-off” management and engineering decision making by the USCG was criticized by the GAO in their March 2004 report GAO-04-380. In 2007, the Department of Homeland Security discovered significant structural design flaws and insufficient C4I capabilities that failed to meet the documented post 9/11 operational requirements. Then in 2006, the GAO reported problematic collaboration among the subcontractors which made any decision-making difficult among them. As a result, the Justice Department conducted an investigation of the Deepwater Program in 2007 and the USCG to assume the role of LSI for the program [CRS Report for Congress, 2007]. In 2010, Congress passed the Coast Guard Authorization Act which prohibited the further use of lead system integrators [Shuster, B., …show more content…
The Deepwater Program provides an example of what can happen when performance requirements are not properly developed and managed.
Departmental reviews in 2007 found there was lack of clarity in performance specifications. In the case of the NSC, for example, performance specifications caused significant disagreements within the Coast Guard. During phase 2 of the contract award, design standards were converted to guidance, and this decision permitted industry teams to select their own alternative standards.
Staffing
Oversight of an LSI of a complex program like Deepwater requires depth of expertise in multiple acquisition-related fields such as program management, system integration, and financial management. In 2007, Congress learned that USCG did not have the required acquisition personnel or experience to manage Deepwater program. The lack of such depth becomes more evident when reviewing the overall Deepwater program acquisition strategy and risks inherent when the strategy was