The period 110-30 B.C., often included in what is called the ‘Crisis of the Roman Republic’ was an extended period of time in which Rome teetered between political stability and political chaos. During this period, the military underwent massive overhauls, changing from conscription oriented to a standing, professional army, based around personal allegiance to the commanding general. However, though the element of personal loyalty was a direct result of the changes that the army saw in the early 1st century B.C. and would ultimately come to brutal crescendos with the various Civil Wars of the era—that element was not in itself a change, but rather an extension of the much older concept of the patron/client relationship that has driven Roman
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This would have significant consequences on political processes in Rome—this was more than a breach of convention. It was a lethal injection of escalating violence into Republican politics that would have been unheard of in the century before, and would be taken to new heights in the century to follow. In many ways, the march of Marius on Rome in 86 B.C. and Caesar crossing the Rubicon in 49 B.C. can be seen as successive actions to the march in 88. These actions should be considered in context—Sulla had led his veterans in the Social War, Marius’s army in 86 consisted of men he raised in Africa—amidst colonies he had settled himself—and Caesar’s legion in 49 had just spent eight years with him in Gaul. Sampson suggests that there is more than a simple case of material wealth at play, but rather a complex evolution in the nature of the army and its relationship with the state which eventually led to a more cavalier attitude towards partisan violence in general. Sampson draws a parallel between Sulla’s army and Strabo’s men in 88 B.C., when the latter murdered the incoming consul without the promise of a profitable campaign or the legitimacy of following a serving consul. The bond between general and soldier seems, therefore, to have superseded any previous civic ties to the state. That said, …show more content…
The power of a prestigious family name has often been instrumental in Republican politics even in times of grave military threat. In 211 B.C., when the two elder Scipios had died while on campaign in Spain, the younger Scipio—later to defeat Hannibal at Zama—was elected to take command. This incident’s significance lies in the fact that, at the age of 25 and having never held a position of either praetor or consul, Scipio was nevertheless invested with imperium, passing over an older and more experienced man sent by the Senate. This was partly due to his personal courage and esteem, yet the power of his family name, the loyalty of the troops to his father, uncle, and himself should not be understated in assessing this appointment. Later, Marius would raise his legions from his veterans, and Pompey would make his military debut under Sulla in 83 B.C. by raising three legions in his native Picenum, off the back of his family connections and the local loyalty to his father. These client/patron relationships underpinned Roman society, and neither Marius nor Sulla introduced the concept of personal allegiance—the former merely laid the foundations for political violence, which the latter
This would have significant consequences on political processes in Rome—this was more than a breach of convention. It was a lethal injection of escalating violence into Republican politics that would have been unheard of in the century before, and would be taken to new heights in the century to follow. In many ways, the march of Marius on Rome in 86 B.C. and Caesar crossing the Rubicon in 49 B.C. can be seen as successive actions to the march in 88. These actions should be considered in context—Sulla had led his veterans in the Social War, Marius’s army in 86 consisted of men he raised in Africa—amidst colonies he had settled himself—and Caesar’s legion in 49 had just spent eight years with him in Gaul. Sampson suggests that there is more than a simple case of material wealth at play, but rather a complex evolution in the nature of the army and its relationship with the state which eventually led to a more cavalier attitude towards partisan violence in general. Sampson draws a parallel between Sulla’s army and Strabo’s men in 88 B.C., when the latter murdered the incoming consul without the promise of a profitable campaign or the legitimacy of following a serving consul. The bond between general and soldier seems, therefore, to have superseded any previous civic ties to the state. That said, …show more content…
The power of a prestigious family name has often been instrumental in Republican politics even in times of grave military threat. In 211 B.C., when the two elder Scipios had died while on campaign in Spain, the younger Scipio—later to defeat Hannibal at Zama—was elected to take command. This incident’s significance lies in the fact that, at the age of 25 and having never held a position of either praetor or consul, Scipio was nevertheless invested with imperium, passing over an older and more experienced man sent by the Senate. This was partly due to his personal courage and esteem, yet the power of his family name, the loyalty of the troops to his father, uncle, and himself should not be understated in assessing this appointment. Later, Marius would raise his legions from his veterans, and Pompey would make his military debut under Sulla in 83 B.C. by raising three legions in his native Picenum, off the back of his family connections and the local loyalty to his father. These client/patron relationships underpinned Roman society, and neither Marius nor Sulla introduced the concept of personal allegiance—the former merely laid the foundations for political violence, which the latter