The Supreme Court case of the US. v. American Library Association occurred in a time when the internet was becoming a widespread, yet widely unadulterated medium. In 2000, Congress introduced the Child Internet Protection act (CIPA), which required public libraries that received funding from the federal government to install a software on their computers that blocked obscene websites. The purpose of this paper is to defend the Supreme Court’s decision to allow CIPA’s software in public libraries by, demonstrating why CIPA was introduced, showing how CIPA is not protected by the first amendment, and pointing out how the leeway of CIPA prevents actual restriction of speech. First, an overview of the case itself.
US. v. American Library Association …show more content…
For example, in the famous Schenck v. US case, the interpretation of the first amendment yielded the metaphor that it is unacceptable to shout, “fire” in a theater when there is not one. This is because creates panic and subsequently a potential dangerous situation for those rushing to exit the theatre at once (Carlton, 2015). To simplify the metaphor further, if the speech causes others to get hurt, then it is not protected by the first amendment. Trampling someone is illegal, therefore inciting an incident where others are trampled because they are rushing to avoid something that is not happening should also illegal. Extending this metaphor to exposing adult material to minors in a public library, and considering this act is already illegal (as previously stated), it is clear that the first amendment does not protect this form of speech. Therefore, CIPA is not …show more content…
If an adult user wishes to access blocked content, they can ask the librarian to remove the block. Since those who are legally able to access the content can request to see it, the government is not violating the first amendment by restricting free speech. In fact, Justice Kennedy started off his concurring opinion by saying if the provision is true, “then there is little to this case” (United States v. American Library Assn., Inc., 2003, p. 215). In the grand scheme of the case, this provision is a happy medium between total restriction and no restriction. Garry (2004) highlights another benefit of this provision as it, “requires willing adults to assume the burdens of opting-in to indecent speech, rather than requiring unwilling recipients to bear all the burden of opting-out” (p. 78). A parent and child should not have to avoid the computer lab to avoid explicit material in a public library, rather an adult should not view explicit material unless they know children are not around to
US. v. American Library Association …show more content…
For example, in the famous Schenck v. US case, the interpretation of the first amendment yielded the metaphor that it is unacceptable to shout, “fire” in a theater when there is not one. This is because creates panic and subsequently a potential dangerous situation for those rushing to exit the theatre at once (Carlton, 2015). To simplify the metaphor further, if the speech causes others to get hurt, then it is not protected by the first amendment. Trampling someone is illegal, therefore inciting an incident where others are trampled because they are rushing to avoid something that is not happening should also illegal. Extending this metaphor to exposing adult material to minors in a public library, and considering this act is already illegal (as previously stated), it is clear that the first amendment does not protect this form of speech. Therefore, CIPA is not …show more content…
If an adult user wishes to access blocked content, they can ask the librarian to remove the block. Since those who are legally able to access the content can request to see it, the government is not violating the first amendment by restricting free speech. In fact, Justice Kennedy started off his concurring opinion by saying if the provision is true, “then there is little to this case” (United States v. American Library Assn., Inc., 2003, p. 215). In the grand scheme of the case, this provision is a happy medium between total restriction and no restriction. Garry (2004) highlights another benefit of this provision as it, “requires willing adults to assume the burdens of opting-in to indecent speech, rather than requiring unwilling recipients to bear all the burden of opting-out” (p. 78). A parent and child should not have to avoid the computer lab to avoid explicit material in a public library, rather an adult should not view explicit material unless they know children are not around to