I Introduction
When evaluating U.S. campaign planning for OIF from 2002 to 2007 against current doctrine, it is arguable that notwithstanding micromanagement from Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and his deputies, the Joint Force commander and his subordinates put together a sufficient operational plan for phases I through III of the campaign. However, the glaring omission of realistic planning for phase IV post-combat stabilization operations set the stage for an explosion of insurgent and sectarian violence. This was then compounded by the inability of the MNF-I commander to accept that the operational environment had changed and required a refinement of the operational approach. Current joint doctrine addresses some of the lessons learned, including inadequate command planning collaboration and insufficient ongoing assessment and evaluation of the campaign’s progress.
II Policy Guidance, the Operational Environment and Defining the Problem
While there has been considerable retrospective evaluation of the success of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Joint Force Commander and his planners adequately evolved their understanding of the operational environment based upon their interpretation of pre-invasion civilian policy guidance to define the problem. According to current doctrine, …show more content…
After considering the operational environment, the problem is defined by identifying the tendencies and potentials of the involved actors, the tensions of the existing conditions and the desired end state. Thus, for CENTCOM the problem was how to remove the Saddam regime and destroy the WMD capability as quickly as possible while maintaining an element of surprise and without alienating regional allies. To accomplish this, GEN Franks and his planners envisioned nearly simultaneous air and ground attacks operations and going straight to Baghdad while forces were still flowing into
When evaluating U.S. campaign planning for OIF from 2002 to 2007 against current doctrine, it is arguable that notwithstanding micromanagement from Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and his deputies, the Joint Force commander and his subordinates put together a sufficient operational plan for phases I through III of the campaign. However, the glaring omission of realistic planning for phase IV post-combat stabilization operations set the stage for an explosion of insurgent and sectarian violence. This was then compounded by the inability of the MNF-I commander to accept that the operational environment had changed and required a refinement of the operational approach. Current joint doctrine addresses some of the lessons learned, including inadequate command planning collaboration and insufficient ongoing assessment and evaluation of the campaign’s progress.
II Policy Guidance, the Operational Environment and Defining the Problem
While there has been considerable retrospective evaluation of the success of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Joint Force Commander and his planners adequately evolved their understanding of the operational environment based upon their interpretation of pre-invasion civilian policy guidance to define the problem. According to current doctrine, …show more content…
After considering the operational environment, the problem is defined by identifying the tendencies and potentials of the involved actors, the tensions of the existing conditions and the desired end state. Thus, for CENTCOM the problem was how to remove the Saddam regime and destroy the WMD capability as quickly as possible while maintaining an element of surprise and without alienating regional allies. To accomplish this, GEN Franks and his planners envisioned nearly simultaneous air and ground attacks operations and going straight to Baghdad while forces were still flowing into