Bonjour's Criticism

BonJour then attacks the holistic view as question-begging. The Holistic view, in BonJour 's conception, assumes that there is no a priori before attacking the notion of analyticity. Quine in effect assumes that the only reason for accepting a claim in the "web of belief" is whether it has to do with accommodating experience; this is question-begging (BonJour, and Devitt 104). BonJour does not deny the Duhemian thesis, but rather holds that the very connections among beliefs that result in the holistic web can only be understood as a priori in character (BonJour, and Devitt 105). BonJour also does not deny that holistic empirical claims can count against a claim stemming from a priori insight, with the solution stemming from each position …show more content…
The first are the many examples which seem to imply some sort of a priori insight; they seem prima facie difficult to explain empirically (Bonjour, and Devitt 100). The most telling examples of this are the truths of math and logic, such as: "nothing can be red all over and green all over at the same time (BonJour, and Devitt 101). People seem to intuitively grasp these truths, which is something that seems difficult to explain empirically. There are also indirect empirical beliefs that depend on a priori beliefs. These include: beliefs about the unobserved past, beliefs about unobserved situations in the present, beliefs about the future and beliefs in the laws of nature (BonJour, 102). BonJour holds that these intuitive examples provide a powerful prima facie argument for the existence of a priori …show more content…
There is no reason for Devitt that the laws of math and logic could be somehow immune from the same system that science is subject to (BonJour, and Devitt 106). The epistemological ambiguity of mathematics and logic is reconciled by the claim that every phenomena seems to be epistemologically ambiguous (BonJour, and Devitt 106). Even the most direct empirical phenomena has an element of epistemological uncertainty (BonJour, and Devitt 107). That there is ambiguity in these phenomena does not demonstrate that they could not possibly be empirical; this same reasoning should apply to math and logic as well (BonJour, and Devitt 107). Devitt 's claim is modest when stating that his theory is the best that is available, and should be taken as default, despite a lack of obvious epistemological solutions. There is also a metaphysical ambiguity about logic and mathematics, which further complicates the epistemological issue (BonJour, and Devitt 107). Necessary truths have also been found to empirical, such as the claim that Hesperus is necessarily Phosphorus (BonJour, and Devitt 107). The fact that these examples are not currently under an empiricist explanation does not mean that they ever will (Devitt 108). These examples should not be