By drawing upon the conclusions reached in the first paragraph and with reference to Jürgen Habermas’ discourse ethics and to Michael Mann’s theory of power, in section (II) I attempt to identify both the minimal and ideal-typical characteristics that a legitimate political authority should possess. Then I go on to consider a classical problem which has troubled political philosophy over the centuries: why do people sometimes fail to recognize that the authority they are subjected to is illegitimate and goes against their justified interests, and they often even go so far as to grant their explicit support to it? And what, instead, makes them able to identify illegitimate authority and drives them to rebel against it, sometimes at the risk of their lives? Here I present a synthetic overview of the – in my opinion – most convincing explanations that, in the theoretical fields of political philosophy and sociology, a number of authors have developed over the years with regards to this
By drawing upon the conclusions reached in the first paragraph and with reference to Jürgen Habermas’ discourse ethics and to Michael Mann’s theory of power, in section (II) I attempt to identify both the minimal and ideal-typical characteristics that a legitimate political authority should possess. Then I go on to consider a classical problem which has troubled political philosophy over the centuries: why do people sometimes fail to recognize that the authority they are subjected to is illegitimate and goes against their justified interests, and they often even go so far as to grant their explicit support to it? And what, instead, makes them able to identify illegitimate authority and drives them to rebel against it, sometimes at the risk of their lives? Here I present a synthetic overview of the – in my opinion – most convincing explanations that, in the theoretical fields of political philosophy and sociology, a number of authors have developed over the years with regards to this