In Book I part 8 of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle says that “to lovers of the fine what is pleasant is what is pleasant by nature” (1099a10-15). He explains that to the people who wish to act nobly and admirably, actions in accordance with excellence fall under this category of pleasant actions. That is, they are both pleasant to the lovers of the fine, and they are also naturally pleasant. On the other hand, some actions that people find pleasant are not, according to Aristotle, naturally pleasant. There are two core parts to Aristotle’s claim here. The first is that some things, e.g. actions in accordance with excellence, are naturally pleasant, whereas some are not. The second is that the things that the “lovers of the fine” (excellent men) find to be pleasant are naturally pleasant.
Aristotle’s proposition brings up some interesting questions. Firstly, why do some people who understand what is fine and naturally pleasant still act against that knowledge? …show more content…
This tendency to act against knowledge of the good is referred to as akrasia, and Aristotle understood it to be an issue with self-control. In Book VII of the Ethics, Aristotle discusses akrasia, saying, “self-control is thought to go with sticking to one’s rational calculations, lack of self-control with departing from them” (1145b10-b13). “Again, the un-self-controlled person acts because of his affective state, knowing that what he is doing is a bad thing,” Aristotle explains, “while the self-controlled one knows that his appetites are bad but does not follow them because of what his reason tells him” (1145b13-b15). It seems that the issue here is that people know what is right to do, what is excellent, but that they allow their appetites to overrule their reason and do the lesser things
Aristotle’s proposition brings up some interesting questions. Firstly, why do some people who understand what is fine and naturally pleasant still act against that knowledge? …show more content…
This tendency to act against knowledge of the good is referred to as akrasia, and Aristotle understood it to be an issue with self-control. In Book VII of the Ethics, Aristotle discusses akrasia, saying, “self-control is thought to go with sticking to one’s rational calculations, lack of self-control with departing from them” (1145b10-b13). “Again, the un-self-controlled person acts because of his affective state, knowing that what he is doing is a bad thing,” Aristotle explains, “while the self-controlled one knows that his appetites are bad but does not follow them because of what his reason tells him” (1145b13-b15). It seems that the issue here is that people know what is right to do, what is excellent, but that they allow their appetites to overrule their reason and do the lesser things