Payton White
Professor Hunsaker
3 September 2016
Articles 26 & 27 After analyzing article 26, “Puppies, Pigs, and People: Eating Meat and Marginal Cases” by Alastair Norcross, a couple things become apparent. Such as (only use “such as” if you are continuing the sentence, but not to start a new sentence.) our author opening up his piece with a fictional scenario that seems a tad bit crazy, but serves as a very serious philosophical point. According to our ( it would be best to just say, “the” author instead of “our” author.) author, Norcross sees meat-eaters-at least those who know of the treatment of factory-farmed animals-are completely at fault for the consumption of meat. The pleasure people receive from eating meat is far outweighed …show more content…
For the purposes of this discussion, to claim that humans have a superior ethical status to animals is the same thing as declaring that it is morally right to give the interest of humans greater weight than those of animals in deciding how to behave. On the other hand, one may argue that it is generally wrong to kill humans, but not animals, because humans are rational and animals aren’t. Along with that, one may claim that the suffering of animals counts less than the suffering of humans because humans are rational, and animals are not. With that being said, lets define what it means to consider what philosophers refer to as ‘marginal cases’. Marginal cases involve whatever kind and level of rationality that is selected by justifying the attribution of superior moral status to …show more content…
Frey entitled, “Moral Standing, the Value of Lives, and Speciesism” defends a view that he refers to as the unequal value thesis-the idea that human life is more valuable than animal life. In correlation with our past article, they both preach that humans are ultimately superior to animals when it comes down to the analytics. In regards to the title, some philosophers have claimed that this is a version of “species,” which refers to the view that being a member of the species Homo sapiens by itself makes human beings more important than other animals. Judging by Fresy’s work in this article, one of his goals is to show that humans can defend the unequal value thesis without relying on speciesist assumptions. Throughout this piece, Frey denies that species membership is by itself a morally important trait. Its not being a human that classifies our species more valuable than any other kind of animal. Rather, our lives are valuable just in proportion to their quality: the higher quality of life, the greater the value of that life. According to Frey, “the quality of life itself is a function of its capacity for enrichment.” To illustrate this point, everyone has this capacity at an incredibly high degree. When we compare the capacity for enriching our lives with that capacity as possessed by a dog, it becomes apparent that our capacity for an enriched life far outlasts the dogs-making humans superior in regard to dogs. To reinforce the point that this
Professor Hunsaker
3 September 2016
Articles 26 & 27 After analyzing article 26, “Puppies, Pigs, and People: Eating Meat and Marginal Cases” by Alastair Norcross, a couple things become apparent. Such as (only use “such as” if you are continuing the sentence, but not to start a new sentence.) our author opening up his piece with a fictional scenario that seems a tad bit crazy, but serves as a very serious philosophical point. According to our ( it would be best to just say, “the” author instead of “our” author.) author, Norcross sees meat-eaters-at least those who know of the treatment of factory-farmed animals-are completely at fault for the consumption of meat. The pleasure people receive from eating meat is far outweighed …show more content…
For the purposes of this discussion, to claim that humans have a superior ethical status to animals is the same thing as declaring that it is morally right to give the interest of humans greater weight than those of animals in deciding how to behave. On the other hand, one may argue that it is generally wrong to kill humans, but not animals, because humans are rational and animals aren’t. Along with that, one may claim that the suffering of animals counts less than the suffering of humans because humans are rational, and animals are not. With that being said, lets define what it means to consider what philosophers refer to as ‘marginal cases’. Marginal cases involve whatever kind and level of rationality that is selected by justifying the attribution of superior moral status to …show more content…
Frey entitled, “Moral Standing, the Value of Lives, and Speciesism” defends a view that he refers to as the unequal value thesis-the idea that human life is more valuable than animal life. In correlation with our past article, they both preach that humans are ultimately superior to animals when it comes down to the analytics. In regards to the title, some philosophers have claimed that this is a version of “species,” which refers to the view that being a member of the species Homo sapiens by itself makes human beings more important than other animals. Judging by Fresy’s work in this article, one of his goals is to show that humans can defend the unequal value thesis without relying on speciesist assumptions. Throughout this piece, Frey denies that species membership is by itself a morally important trait. Its not being a human that classifies our species more valuable than any other kind of animal. Rather, our lives are valuable just in proportion to their quality: the higher quality of life, the greater the value of that life. According to Frey, “the quality of life itself is a function of its capacity for enrichment.” To illustrate this point, everyone has this capacity at an incredibly high degree. When we compare the capacity for enriching our lives with that capacity as possessed by a dog, it becomes apparent that our capacity for an enriched life far outlasts the dogs-making humans superior in regard to dogs. To reinforce the point that this