One suggestion that Rawls may be receptive to Waldron’s argument for considering freedom in terms of space lies in his list of essential liberties. Rawls explicitly states that among the right to freedom of speech and association, “the right to hold personal property” is one of the essential liberties a person has (Rawls 53). This is particularly important since Rawls’ conception of justice is broken down into two main principles: the first includes the essential liberties belonging to all members of society and the second includes the distribution of resources that determines the ability of individuals to exercise their essential liberties. He argues that the first principle takes priority over the second principle, since “the basic equal liberties protected by the first principle cannot be justified, or compensated for, by greater social and economic advantages” (Rawls 53-54). This hierarchical ordering suggests that Rawls likely considers property to be as essential of a component of freedom as Waldron does and that Rawls would likely be receptive to Waldron’s introduction of the spatial element of freedom. It also complements Waldron’s broader goal in discussing freedom, space, and homelessness. Waldron is particularly concerned with what he considers to be an encroachment on the freedom of homeless people—that public property laws are prioritizing the well-off members of society over the homeless by preventing the homeless from taking care of basic needs (i.e. stopping homeless citizens from sleeping on park benches). Rawls may argue that these laws are unjust since they prioritize the second principle over the first; they provide social advantages for the rich (i.e. not having to deal as much with ‘gross’ homeless people) at the detriment of the basic needs of
One suggestion that Rawls may be receptive to Waldron’s argument for considering freedom in terms of space lies in his list of essential liberties. Rawls explicitly states that among the right to freedom of speech and association, “the right to hold personal property” is one of the essential liberties a person has (Rawls 53). This is particularly important since Rawls’ conception of justice is broken down into two main principles: the first includes the essential liberties belonging to all members of society and the second includes the distribution of resources that determines the ability of individuals to exercise their essential liberties. He argues that the first principle takes priority over the second principle, since “the basic equal liberties protected by the first principle cannot be justified, or compensated for, by greater social and economic advantages” (Rawls 53-54). This hierarchical ordering suggests that Rawls likely considers property to be as essential of a component of freedom as Waldron does and that Rawls would likely be receptive to Waldron’s introduction of the spatial element of freedom. It also complements Waldron’s broader goal in discussing freedom, space, and homelessness. Waldron is particularly concerned with what he considers to be an encroachment on the freedom of homeless people—that public property laws are prioritizing the well-off members of society over the homeless by preventing the homeless from taking care of basic needs (i.e. stopping homeless citizens from sleeping on park benches). Rawls may argue that these laws are unjust since they prioritize the second principle over the first; they provide social advantages for the rich (i.e. not having to deal as much with ‘gross’ homeless people) at the detriment of the basic needs of