Carmichael (1932) found that showing objects during a learning phase in addition to pairing the objects with a specific word lead to participants redrawing an object in regards to the paired word. Ballets and Dale (2007) found that reading a passage related to one way an ambiguous figure can be perceived resulted in the participants perceiving the ambiguous figure depicted by the passage. Bugelski and Alampay (1961) demonstrated the ability of seeing a biased image (one catered to perceiving an ambiguous figure one way versus another) before visually experiencing the related ambiguous figure resulted in perceiving the ambiguous figure based on the initial biased image. However, Goolkasian and Woodberry (2010) found that exposing participants to a loosely associated prime (either image of object or object name) results in a priming effect, but only if a semantic relationship was established between the prime and the ambiguous image. There is no past research on whether or not priming through imagination has the ability to see the ambiguous figure one way versus another. Therefore, we explored whether priming via imagining an image results in perceiving an ambiguous figure one way versus
Carmichael (1932) found that showing objects during a learning phase in addition to pairing the objects with a specific word lead to participants redrawing an object in regards to the paired word. Ballets and Dale (2007) found that reading a passage related to one way an ambiguous figure can be perceived resulted in the participants perceiving the ambiguous figure depicted by the passage. Bugelski and Alampay (1961) demonstrated the ability of seeing a biased image (one catered to perceiving an ambiguous figure one way versus another) before visually experiencing the related ambiguous figure resulted in perceiving the ambiguous figure based on the initial biased image. However, Goolkasian and Woodberry (2010) found that exposing participants to a loosely associated prime (either image of object or object name) results in a priming effect, but only if a semantic relationship was established between the prime and the ambiguous image. There is no past research on whether or not priming through imagination has the ability to see the ambiguous figure one way versus another. Therefore, we explored whether priming via imagining an image results in perceiving an ambiguous figure one way versus