The term “common sense” in Culler’s chapter seems akin to the commonly used term “social construct,” or an idea that is simply a part of our quotidian lives. For example, Foucault “suggests ‘sex’ is...produced by...a range of social practices...or discursive practices” (5) and he “treats sex as an effect rather than a cause” (7). Foucault’s analysis disputes the way the public normally regards sex: as a natural process. In a similar way, Derrida utilizes Rousseau’s obsession with absence and presence to contest how we view the world as a whole. Instead of life being one composite reality, Derrida argues it is in fact an amalgamation of signs and supplements. Both of these examples exemplify how theorists examine the current definition of a concept and then question it. Finally, Culler claims theory is a form of metacognition. Foucault thinks about how we think about sex and Derrida thinks about how we think about writing. However, Culler concedes the metacognitive nature engenders “one of the most dismaying features of theory of today” (15). To explain, if Foucault is thinking about thinking about sex, another theorist could come along and think about the way Foucault thinks about the way we think about sex, and so forth. Thus, theory is “unmasterable” because “there are always important things you don’t know”
The term “common sense” in Culler’s chapter seems akin to the commonly used term “social construct,” or an idea that is simply a part of our quotidian lives. For example, Foucault “suggests ‘sex’ is...produced by...a range of social practices...or discursive practices” (5) and he “treats sex as an effect rather than a cause” (7). Foucault’s analysis disputes the way the public normally regards sex: as a natural process. In a similar way, Derrida utilizes Rousseau’s obsession with absence and presence to contest how we view the world as a whole. Instead of life being one composite reality, Derrida argues it is in fact an amalgamation of signs and supplements. Both of these examples exemplify how theorists examine the current definition of a concept and then question it. Finally, Culler claims theory is a form of metacognition. Foucault thinks about how we think about sex and Derrida thinks about how we think about writing. However, Culler concedes the metacognitive nature engenders “one of the most dismaying features of theory of today” (15). To explain, if Foucault is thinking about thinking about sex, another theorist could come along and think about the way Foucault thinks about the way we think about sex, and so forth. Thus, theory is “unmasterable” because “there are always important things you don’t know”